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On October 1, 1949, the day of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the People’s Daily ran an announcement 
from the newly established All China Democratic 
Women’s Foundation, calling on the women of China 
to welcome the newly established government. i “Un-
der the leadership of this government,” it said, “we 
women will achieve liberation and enjoy the right of 
male-female equality, and we will able to effectively 
contribute our energies to participate in the building 
of a new China.”1 The statement represented the of-
ficial continuation of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
longstanding commitment to the political platform 
of gender equality. Although the Party’s internal 
structure was thoroughly patriarchal, Party lead-
ers advanced a comprehensive and radical agenda 
of women’s liberation in their writings, which drew 
widespread support from women in China, espe-
cially in the upper middle classes. A commitment to 
i  The All China Democratic Women’s Foundation would later become 
known as the All China Women’s Foundation.
women’s political participation at levels well above 
what was featured in the Party at the time was fun-
damental to that agenda. Mao himself spoke in 1934 
of a future in which women were liberated from the 
institution of marriage. But “first,” he said, “comes the 
possession of political freedom.”2 
 Contemporary China has not realized the 
lofty goals of early Party rhetoric on women’s equal-
ity in politics. Its failure is by no means unusual. 
Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union indicate 
that women make up just 21.3 percent of parliaments 
worldwide at the beginning of 2014.3 Higher posi-
tions of power are even more elusive. In 2010, just 11 
of 192 heads of government worldwide were female.4 
Chinese views on the role of women in politics are 
fairly typical internationally, roughly at the median 
of Inglehart and Norris’s data set of sixty-two coun-
tries that measures popular views of women’s place in 
politics.5 Many of the prejudices they identified that 
bear on Chinese women seeking careers in politics 
echo those experienced around the world. Chinese 
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abstract
This essay uses a mix of secondary literature, primary sources, and quantitative analysis 
to offer a comprehensive account of the ebbs and flows in women’s representation in Chi-
nese politics during the reform (post-1978) era. The literature to date offers two conflict-
ing accounts of women’s representation during this era. Some scholars present the peri-
od as a time of consistent decline; others present gains in representation levels from the 
1990s onwards. This essay reconciles these two narratives for a unified account. It does so 
by updating Jude Howell’s concept of “state feminism” in reform-era China to show how 
state interests and civil society demands together determined women's participation lev-
els during this period. The concept of "state feminism" treats women's representation in 
Chinese politics from 1949 to today as a reflection of state needs. Such a state-centric view 
has fueled many of the "declinist" depictions of female representation in the reform era. 
This essay affirms state feminism's dominant role in suppressing women's representation 
through the mid-1990s. But it also shows how the state, by promoting economic develop-
ment and closing gender gaps in educational attainment, has had a moderately positive 
impact on women's representation over the past two decades. During the same period, 
civil society pressures have also emerged as a significant factor behind rising representa-
tion levels. For this reason, accounts of women’s representation in Chinese politics today 
must incorporate both state and non-state actors in their analyses as substantive influences.
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men, like men of most other countries, often perceive 
women with political ambitions to be passive, lacking 
in leadership ability, and dangerously seductive.6  
 London School of Economics professor Jude 
Howell centers her brief survey of the history of 
women’s political participation in post-1949 China 
around her concept of “state-derived feminism”: 
not just the official gender ideology in post-1949 
China but also the set of practical strategies used 
to enhance women’s status and the particular 
institutional arrangements made to that end. … 
It has a monopoly on the explanation of women’s 
oppression, on the management of social change, 
and on the imagination of the alternative.7
Howell sees state-derived feminism as the driv-
ing force behind “the cycles of advance and retreat 
that have characterized women’s numerical repre-
sentation in politics and government since 1949.” 
She analyzes these ebbs and flows throughout four 
historical periods. Participation surged in the early 
1950s, during the first years of the Mao period. A 
brief decline followed in the early 1960s, but partici-
pation picked up again from the late 1960s through 
the 1970s during the most infamous movement in 
post-1949 Chinese politics, the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao’s death and the subsequent “reform era” of state 
overhaul under Deng Xiaoping precipitated a more 
extended fall in the 1980s and 1990s.ii Under How-
ell’s framework, participation rises when the Party 
needs to mobilize women “for the purpose of socio-
economic transformation, raising economic output, 
or for ideological and political ends”; it slumps when 
“the heat of political campaigns cools, and/or when 
economic restructuring requires adjustments in the 
labor force.” The strength of state-derived feminism 
is largely dependent upon its juxtaposition with the 
larger political, economic, and social needs of the 
state. 
 Howell’s essay stands out in the literature 
on Chinese women in politics since 1949, because 
it combines a broad historical sweep with an un-
usual level of theoretical sophistication through its 
conception of state-derived feminism. Nevertheless, 
more than ten years after the essay’s publication, the 
reform period deserves a new narrative. Howell and 
other earlier scholars of women’s place in reform-era 
politics present a picture of uninterrupted decline, 
ii  She presents her analysis in terms of three periods: the 1950s, the Cultural 
Revolution, and the reform era. I speak of four to include her analysis of the 
1960s, which she uses to set up her discussion of the Cultural Revolution.
and some scholars today still subscribe to this view.8 
More contemporary scholars, however, present a 
more positive narrative of reform based upon trends 
from the past two decades, but they have yet to have 
yet to engage with the struggles of the early reform 
period documented by earlier scholars.9  
 This essay attempts to reconcile the “declin-
ist” thesis with the successes of the past two decades 
that have come into focus in the works of more re-
cent scholars. In doing so, it seeks to show how the 
“monopoly” state-derived feminism held in deter-
mining female representation in Chinese politics has 
weakened during the reform period to bring about a 
more nuanced relationship between state feminism 
and civil society pressures. The declines of the early 
reform period—from the late 1970s through much of 
the 1990s—reflect the dominance of state feminism. 
The progress of the next two decades, or late reform, 
in part reflects state feminism’s increasingly positive 
influence, manifested in the edifying effects of eco-
nomic development and in policies promoting wom-
en for cadre selection. However, that progress also 
owes to the growing women’s movement in Chinese 
civil society, whose influence on policy in the past 
two decades has challenged the place of the state as 
the sole driver of changes in women’s role in Chinese 
politics.  
 The paper will unfold as follows. The first sec-
tion will examine the decline in representation levels 
in the early reform period from their highs during 
the early 1970s. Many general overviews speak of this 
decline as a single, temporally consistent process,10 
but I divide it into early and late reform. The former 
features a rapid drop during the early 1980s, followed 
by a subsequent period of stagnation through much 
of the 1990s. Early reform represented the state’s de-
termination to leave the tumultuous politics of the 
early 1970s behind; late reform reflected institutional 
developments in the Chinese bureaucracy that pro-
duced a very difficult environment for female politi-
cal hopefuls. In both cases, state feminism suppressed 
female representation, because doing otherwise 
would not have been compatible with state ends. The 
second section will focus upon the interplay between 
state feminism and civil society feminism in lifting 
women’s representation levels during late reform. 
 I will focus primarily on women’s positions 
within relatively prestigious organs in the party-state 
bureaucracy: the National People’s Congress (NPC), 
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Central Party Committee (CPC), and Politburo at the 
national level, as well as assorted leadership positions 
at subnational levels. I will supplement this data with 
statistics on membership in the neighborhood and 
village committees. My choices here follow the gen-
eral approach in the literature, though it is restricted 
by lack of complete access to data in other parts of 
the bureaucracy.
FROM REVOLUTION TO MODERNIZATION: DE-
CLINE AND STAGNATION THROUGH THE 1990S 
 The declinist thesis of women’s representa-
tion in reform-era Chinese politics draws much of its 
salience from the struggles that women faced from 
1978 through much of the 1990s (what I call “early 
reform”). Representation had peaked during the 
political tumult of a decade 
in Chinese politics known 
as the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976). The bulk of the 
reform-era decline occurred in 
the early 1980s, as the Chinese 
state sought to distance itself 
from the legacy of the Cultural 
Revolution. Subsequent chang-
es in the Chinese bureaucracy 
further ensured that female 
representation remained low 
through much of the 1990s. 
 
The Early 1980s Backlash 
Against the Cultural Revolu-
tion
The early 1980s was a 
time of rapid retreat for Chi-
nese women in politics. From 
the Politburo to the bottom 
rungs of the cadre hierarchy, 
female representation had 
reached unprecedented levels during the Cultural 
Revolution due to exceptionally strong central sup-
port. However, this level of support fell with the 
Cultural Revolution, as the Chinese state under Deng 
Xiaoping shed its focus on social equality to concen-
trate on economic modernization. As a result, by the 
mid-1980s, the gains of the Cultural Revolution had 
almost completely disappeared. This disappearance 
revealed just how superficial and state-dependent 
these gains really were.
The Cultural Revolution offered an unusu-
ally favorable environment for prospective female 
cadres. The decade featured a succession of nation-
wide factional struggles as Mao sought to purge his 
opponents under the guise of a campaign against 
Chinese society’s anti-communist elements. He com-
plemented these purges by seizing control of cadre 
selection to introduce a wave of proletarians into 
the party-state bureaucracy.11 Maoist analysis had 
always viewed female oppression primarily through 
the lens of class struggle, and so women with politi-
cal aspirations—especially proletarian women—were 
appropriated as a class free of bourgeois leanings.12 
Official policy required that each leadership group 
(lingdao banzi) had to have at least one female cadre 
in order to be approved.13 Female prospective cadres 
also benefitted here from the ascent to the Politburo 
of Mao’s controversial wife Jiang Qing in 1969, who 
used her political and personal status to become a 
powerful proponent for greater female representa-
tion.14 
 As a result, female representation in elite 
politics (Tables 1-3) is widely considered by scholars 
to have reached levels unprecedented in the his-
tory of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution.15 
Women reached the Politburo during this period 
Table 1: Female Representation in the National People’s Congress (NPC)18 
 
NPC (Year Elected) Number of  
Female Delegates 
Number of  
Male Delegates 
Share of Female 
Delegates (%) 
1st (1954) 147 1079 12.0 
2nd (1959) 150 1076 12.2 
3rd (1964) 542 2492 17.8 
4th (1975) 653 2232 22.6 
5th (1978) 742 2755 21.2 
6th (1983) 632 2346 21.2 
7th (1988) 634 2344 21.3 
8th (1993) 626 2329 21.0 
9th (1998) 650 2329 21.8 
10th (2003) 604 2381 20.2 
11th (2008) 637 2350 21.3 
12th (2013) 699 2288 23.4 
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for the first time in the country’s history, though the 
three who reached full member status were wives 
of top leaders Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Zhou En-
lai.16, iii However, two women were named alternate 
members who did not have such status: Wu Guxian, 
an uneducated textile worker anointed as a “labor 
iii  The executive body of the Communist Party, and, as such, the second-
most powerful political institution in the PRC behind the Politburo Standing 
Committee, a subset of Politburo members that works as a sort of inner cabinet 
and is responsible for the state’s major legislative decisions. The Politburo has 
both full and alternate members; alternates are nonvoting. 
heroine” by Mao himself, and Chen 
Muhua, a longtime revolutionary who 
had risen through the ranks since 
joining the party in 1938.17 Repre-
sentation in the National People’s 
Congress rose sharply as well, peaking 
in 1975 at 22.6 percent in the general 
body and 27.1 percent among full 
members of the standing committee.iv 
More importantly, the proportion of 
women among full members of the 
Party Central Committee—the actual 
seat of decision-making power—
reached its apex of 10.3 percent in 
1973.
The Cultural Revolution also 
brought gains to female representa-
tion at lower levels of politics. Nation-
wide statistics are hard to come by for 
this period, but the proportion of fe-
male cadres reached 16-20 percent of 
cadres at district, county, and bureau 
levels in Beijing by 1972. Women also 
constituted 17-22 percent of cadres 
in Shanghai’s Party Committee and 
its Revolutionary Committee, which 
was the Cultural Revolution-era proxy 
for municipal government.21 Female 
representation at lower levels of the 
Party and the state was also strong, 
as women’s share among lower-level 
cadres in Shanghai was almost 50 
percent.22 As for the Party itself, 13.5 
percent of new recruits into rural Par-
ty branches were female between 1966 
and 1975. More impressively, however, 
11 percent of rural Party branches in 
1973 had female secretaries or deputy 
secretaries, a sign that the traditional 
view that women can only handle 
women’s work was perhaps starting to erode.23 
In 1978, two years after Mao’s death, the Chi-
iv  Ostensibly the highest state legislative body of the PRC, though true 
legal authority lies with the Politburo, and especially the Politburo Standing 
Committee. The NPC historically served as a rubber stamp for laws ratified 
by the Politburo, but it has started to assert some degree of independence 
since the 1990s. It rarely rejects Politburo legislation today, but debates in 
the NPC have become an important forum for resolving disputes between 
the Party and other parts of government. The NPC also has its own Standing 
Committee, with around 5–7 percent of the members of the overall body. As 
with the Politburo, the NPC Standing Committee meets more regularly than 
the full NPC—several times a year, as opposed to just once—and is more 
powerful than the larger body. 
 
Table 2: Female Representation in the Standing Committee of the NPC (Full Members)19 
 
NPC (Year Elected) Number of  
Female Members 
Number of  
Male Members 
Share of Female 
Members (%) 
1st (1954) 3 73 4.0 
2nd (1959) 4 58 6.5 
3rd (1964) 17 79 17.4 
4th (1975) 39 105 27.1 
5th (1978) 35 148 19.1 
6th (1983) 13 125 9.4 
7th (1988) 16 121 11.7 
8th (1993) 17 121 12.3 
9th (1998) 16 118 12.0 
10th (2003) 21 138 13.0 
11th (2008) 26 161 16.1 
12th (2013) 25 161 15.5 
	  
Table 3: Female Representation in the Party Central Committee (Full Members)20 
 
Central Committee 
(Year Selected)  
Number of  
Female Members 
Number of  
Male Members 
Share of Female 
Members (%) 
8th (1956) 4 93 4.1 
9th (1969) 13 157 7.6 
10th (1973) 20 175 10.3 
11th (1977) 14 201 7.0 
12th (1982) 11 210 5.2 
13th (1987) 10 175 5.7 
14th (1992) 12 189 6.4 
15th (1997) 8 193 4.1 
16th (2002) 5 198 2.5 
17th (2007) 13 204 6.4 
18th (2012) 10 205 4.9 
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nese leadership launched the Reform and Opening 
Up (gaige kaifang) program. The initiative sought to 
center state policy around a pragmatic approach to 
economic development instead of the ideologically 
charged dogmatism that had defined Chinese politics 
throughout the Mao era. Five years later, the Cultural 
Revolution-era gains in women’s representation had 
disappeared. Women’s share in the first reform-era 
Party Central Committee in 1982 dropped below 
1969 levels to 5.2 percent, and no women were pro-
moted to the new Politburo. v Female representation 
only shrank marginally in the following year’s Na-
tional People’s Congress as a whole, but saw a precipi-
tous drop in the NPC Standing Committee, falling to 
just 9.4 percent in 1983.
Lower levels seem to have experienced a similar 
clear-out. Wang Qi cites evidence from leading Chi-
nese women’s studies scholar Li Xiaojing that one to 
two-thirds of the cadres removed from office were 
female during the dismantling of the revolutionary 
committees in 1982-83.24 Wang Yinpeng presents 
official data on the share of female leaders in what 
Wang Qi calls “State organs and their working bod-
ies” in 1982, and found only 9 percent at the provin-
cial level and just 5 percent in the country’s prefec-
tures, cities, and counties.25 , vi The female share 
of new cadres in rural Party branches fell from 13.5 
percent in 1966-1975 to 8.6 percent in 1977-1982.26
Wang Qi writes that the Cultural Revolution 
“went down in history as a golden age for women’s 
representation in China and is still remembered as 
such.”27 But the rapid reversal of the 1980s exposed 
just how limited that golden age really was. This 
reversal can in part be explained by the transforma-
tions in the Chinese party-state bureaucracy in the 
post-Mao era. The push to recruit more technically 
and professionally accomplished cadres—that is, cad-
res with educational backgrounds far more abundant 
among men than women—was inseparable from 
the program of economic modernization that lay at 
the heart of Deng’s vision for China.28 Still, such a 
drastic decline in women’s representation cannot be 
attributed solely to a modernization program that 
v  The body of the Party charged with selecting members for the Party’s 
most important positions, including the General Secretary, the Politburo, the 
Politburo Standing Committee, and the Central Military Commission. The 
Central Committee has more power within the broader party-state apparatus 
than the NPC, but its pseudo-democratic structure still belies a top-down 
approach to Party leadership selection.
vi  Unfortunately, Wang does not specify what she means by “State organs and 
their working bodies,” and I did not have access to the almanac from which 
she drew her figures.
was only in its infancy. Deng and his supporters had 
a positive program for overhauling the state, but they 
first had to excise the legacy of Cultural Revolution, 
a decade of turmoil so extreme that, in their eyes, it 
demanded a wholesale rejection. Women were easy 
targets for this because of traditional social prejudices 
and because they were one of the favored classes of 
Mao and his deposed supporters.29 
Comparing China in the early 1980s and post-
Soviet states in the early 1990s provides a useful il-
lustration of the role of the state in China’s transition-
era decline. Women experienced a drastic decline in 
political representation after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union; the female share in the national parliaments 
of post-Communist Europe, for instance, fell from a 
regional average of 30 percent to less than 10 percent 
in the new states.30 Admittedly, the post-Soviet de-
cline was a product of elections as opposed to chang-
ing top-down selection mechanisms, and the Soviet 
bureaucracy did not seek out uneducated cadres as 
Mao did in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. and 
Cultural Revolution China both featured states that 
that (1) had appropriated formal female representa-
tion for their own political ends and (2) were politi-
cally abhorrent to their successors.31 As a result, 
when those states collapsed, female political partici-
pation sank as well.
Stagnation Through the 1990s
The low levels of female participation that 
emerged in the early 1980s remained in place well 
into the following decade. This was especially true at 
the lowest levels of government. In 1993, the female 
share of chief and deputy chief positions was 3.8 
percent in townships and small towns, 5.9 percent in 
counties, 5.1 percent in cities, and 4.1 percent in pre-
fectures.32 The average recruitment share of female 
cadres in rural Party branches dropped to 5.9 percent 
in 1983-1990.33 As late as the early 2000s, one survey 
of 218 villages in Zhejiang found that half of local 
Party branches did not have female members.34 The 
provinces showed almost no improvement in the fe-
male share of leadership positions between 1982 and 
1990.35
The national level showed some small gains. The 
number of women in the Central Committee held 
more or less steady between 1982 and 1992, even 
as the size of the body overall shrank by 10 percent, 
and representation in the NPC Standing Commit-
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tee climbed 3 percent to 12.3 percent. Overall NPC 
representation was unchanged versus the early 1980s 
but still quite high, as the NPC continued to serve 
as the body of choice for the state’s attempts to keep 
up appearances on its commitment to gender equal-
ity.36 , vii However, women’s share in the Central 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
an important central advisory body, hit its nadir of 
9.4 percent in 1994, and only four of ninety-nine 
ministries and commissions that year were headed by 
women.37 , viii
The lack of progress reflected the dearth of state 
support during this period for women’s participation 
in government. The Organization Department did 
not issue its first regulation specifically on selecting 
female cadres in the reform-era period until April 
of 1988, and the first with actual numerical targets 
came only in 1990.38 State rhetoric no longer sought 
to efface gender differences as it had during the Cul-
tural Revolution, leading to renewed acceptance in 
public discourse of traditional views of women as 
passive and domestic.39 Meanwhile, the All-China 
Women’s Federation (ACWF)—which cooperates 
with the Organizational Department to provide input 
on short-term and long-term plans for female re-
cruitment—found its funding and staffing resources 
increasingly constricted.40 To be sure, the ACWF’s 
potential as a champion has always been limited. The 
organization succeeded the All China Democratic 
Women’s Foundation in the 1950s as a state-affiliated 
“mass organization,” tasked with transmitting Party 
policy and ideology on gender to the masses. Party 
ideology since the founding of the PRC has included 
the doctrine that women’s liberation is merely a sub-
set of economic liberation, rather than a separate 
problem in need of a tailored approach.41 Moreover, 
the ACWF is a sub-ministerial organ, which limits 
its access to top Party decision-makers.42 Nonethe-
less, the organization could still provide politically-
inclined women with a level of state access that no 
other women’s group could match. However, state 
vii  The most frequently cited ranking of women in politics internationally 
comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, who measure the share of women 
in national parliaments. The NPC is toothless compared to most democratic 
parliaments, but by preserving a relatively high level of female representation 
here, the Chinese government can buttress its place in these rankings for 
international and domestic audiences alike—as late as 1994, China ranked 
12th. See Edwards, “Strategizing for politics.”
viii  The CPPCC serves as a central advisory body structured to represent a 
wider range of voices than most other party-state organs. It is comprised of 
delegates from China’s various political parties as well as appointed individuals 
not affiliated with any particular party. (China does have parties other than 
the CCP, but they are functionally powerless.) 
policy in early reform left the ACWF gutted. Staffing 
reductions meant that some townships had just one 
or two ACWF staffers, while many counties in the 
early 1990s had just 500 RMB for ACWF activities 
annually after payroll expenses.43
In the absence of explicit state support mecha-
nisms, women were expected to compete with men 
for cadre positions solely on the basis of suzhi, or 
“quality.” The concept of suzhi is a uniquely post-
Mao Chinese concoction: an amalgam of ideas about 
Confucian malleability, Maoist self-cultivation, and 
the reform bureaucracy’s predilection for technical 
and professional competence, all coalescing into a 
mainstay of official discourse.44 Today, educational 
background tends to serve as a proxy measure, and as 
such, its influence on cadre selection is profound.45 
More than half of Party members in the early 2000s 
had at least completed high school, and almost 90 
percent of local officials had college educations.46 
This emphasis on education itself disadvantages 
women, given the persistent educational achievement 
gap in contemporary China. Moreover, gender preju-
dices seep into perceptions of female suzhi. In the 
context of cadre positions, suzhi entails excellence in 
fields such as logic and abstract thinking, which tra-
ditional conceptions of gender treat as women’s weak 
spots.47 The concept of suzhi also blames inequalities 
in women’s access to political power on female inad-
equacy rather than structural injustice, discouraging 
governing bodies from adopting affirmative action 
policies.48 Women’s groups in China have not re-
belled against this turn per se. The ACWF’s efforts to 
bring more women into politics since the late 1980s 
have consisted in large part of efforts to improve 
women’s suzhi, taking up programs offering technical 
training and instilling in women four qualities associ-
ated with suzhi: self-respect (zizun), self-confidence 
(zixin), self-reliance (zili), and self-strength (ziq-
iang).49
The early reform changes detailed above af-
fected women’s representation through the traditional 
methods of cadre recruitment via state appointment. 
But the late 1980s saw the introduction of a new 
means of a cadre selection for village-level admin-
istration: elections. The NPC Standing Committee 
adopted elections for village government in 1987, and 
a nationwide survey in 1990 showed that 75 percent 
of villages had held their first elections, with half of 
these featuring more candidates that seats.50 They 
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were not show elections—voters in Shandong alone 
ousted 10,000-20,000 cadres in 1995. In practical 
terms, elected village committees are not as powerful 
as village Party branches, and, in particular, local Par-
ty secretaries.51 Nonetheless, they have taken over a 
broad array of economic management functions that 
were handled by people’s communes in the 1960s and 
1970s. They also serve as an important channel for 
villagers to enter the Party, as successful candidates 
from outside the Party are usually recruited for mem-
bership.52 In this sense, their establishment served 
as the village-level equivalent to the post-Mao trans-
formation in cadre selection methods at higher levels 
detailed above. 
Many scholars claim that the introduction of 
competitive elections has brought about a decline in 
women’s political participation at the village level.53 
While these scholars give plenty of evidence that elec-
tions are gendered, they cite almost no data to show 
that elections make for a more gendered cadre cohort 
than what was experienced under the people’s com-
mune system, and it is difficult to find data on gender 
differentials among village-level cadres to assess their 
claims. But it should be noted that even early Mao-
era village governance seems to have made plenty of 
room for women: according to Wang Fenghua, 70 
percent of villages during the 1950s had female heads 
or deputy heads.54 In the early 2000s, however, just 1 
percent of village committee chairs and 16 percent of 
members were female, for an average of two female 
committee members per three villages.55
Regardless, the disadvantages that women face 
in Chinese village elections are indisputable—they 
are less likely to be named as candidates, and less 
likely to win when they run.56 These disadvantages 
in part reflect traditional views on gender among the 
rural Chinese. The end of the Mao-era suppression 
of gender and the introduction of elections has given 
these views full public expression. An early 2000s 
survey in rural Zhejiang found that 73 percent of 
respondents considered political participation to be 
“men’s business.”57 In contrast, results from the 2005 
World Values Survey (WVS) indicate that 53 percent 
of Chinese citizens nationwide consider men more 
capable political leaders than women.58 Moreover, 
the introduction of elections has disadvantaged the 
large proportion of rural women who marry men 
from other villages; such women are expected to 
move to their husband’s village, and so they find it 
more difficult to accumulate the needed social capital 
to mount a run for office.59 From the same Zhejiang 
study cited earlier, a sample of female cadres from 
twenty-three villages found that just 13 percent had 
married into their villages, compared to 63 percent of 
women in the villages as a whole.60
One might view the negative impacts of elec-
tions cited above as collateral damage from a progres-
sive state policy. But as with cadre selection at higher 
levels, the state’s treatment of women in politics has 
also actively harmed female villagers’ chances as 
candidates. The 1987 Organic Law of Village Com-
mittees that established elections contained the 
stipulation that village committees should include 
“an appropriate number of women” (funü yingdang 
you shidang de ming’e), but no explicit quotas were 
introduced until 2010.61, ix In the absence of stricter 
dictates, the clause became functionally interpreted 
as “no more than one” female member, out of each 
village committee’s three to seven slots.62 Meanwhile, 
an early 1990s survey of twenty unsuccessful female 
candidates in Liaoning cited in Rosen highlighted 
how the consistent shunting of women into women’s 
work hurt the chances of female candidates.63 Those 
who did have government experience had accumu-
lated it primarily in “soft” jobs in fields like culture 
and education, and as a result, voters doubted their 
leadership and management abilities. Others came 
from backgrounds in “woman’s work,” a term for jobs 
related to family planning; the unpopularity of these 
policies undercut their efforts to mobilize support. 
Beyond this, the funding and staffing reductions at 
the ACWF mentioned above weakened a resource 
that sought to link women with mobilization aids like 
lineages and higher-level officials, which are more 
easily available to male candidates.64
After the sharp declines of the early 1980s, Chi-
nese women’s representation in politics showed little 
improvement through much of the 1990s. The intro-
duction of elections in the villages and the modern-
ization of cadre selection at higher levels, combined 
with the weakening of the state’s active mechanisms 
to promote women in politics, fostered a very dif-
ficult institutional environment for women with po-
litical aspirations. Many of the challenges that such 
women faced in this period—the suzhi discourse, 
toothless state dictates, and, of course, traditional no-
tions of women’s unsuitability in politics—continue 
ix  Note that the elections were initially established as a trial; they were 
adopted in full in 1998, and the new law preserved the language.
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to work against female political participation today. 
Still, other developments over the past twenty years 
have brought about real, although very much incom-
plete, improvements. I turn to these below.
A FITFUL ADVANCE: REFORM-ERA PROGRESS IN 
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION
The data on women’s representation in Chi-
nese politics suggests substantive improvements in 
women’s position over the past twenty years, most 
strikingly at lower levels of government. These im-
provements in part follow from measures that, as 
with Mao-era feminism, realized gender equality for 
ulterior state purposes—improving China’s image in 
international eyes, or more indirectly, strengthening 
the educational qualifications of the Chinese labor 
force. But credit also goes to the growing women’s 
movement in Chinese civil society, which, through 
its influence on the AWCF, has contributed to a 
succession of progressive initiatives regarding the 
composition of the bureaucracy: affirmative action, 
policy plans, and even a change in cadre promotion 
criteria. In this sense, the developments of late reform 
suggest that the concept of state-derived feminism is 
no longer sufficient on its own to explain changes in 
women’s representation in Chinese politics; civil soci-
ety feminism matters as well.
Women’s formal representation in Chinese 
politics has grown on a number of fronts over the 
past several decades. The share of female cadres over 
the entire bureaucracy has increased steadily since 
the start of the 1990s, from 31.2 percent in 1991 to 
nearly 40 percent in 2007.65, x Women’s presence in 
the Party also expanded, from 15.1 percent in 1993 to 
19.2 percent in 2005. Once again, improvements have 
been concentrated in lower levels of government and 
at the grassroots level. The share of women among 
village committee members nationwide reached 21.7 
percent in 2008, and the proportion of female heads 
inched up from 1 percent in 2000 to 2.7 percent.66 
Women made up 13 percent of mayors nationwide in 
2006, up from 5 percent in 1989 and 10.9 percent in 
2001.67 One metric that fell was women’s representa-
tion in the urban neighborhood committees, from 59 
percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2011.68, xi  But this 
x  If these figures seem high, note that most statistics cited to this point in 
the text refer to women in national positions or in leadership roles at sub-
provincial levels, as opposed to more mundane assignments. 
xi  Urban neighborhood communities are the urban equivalent of the village 
committee, whose members have also been elected since 1990.
seems to be a positive sign as well. The existence of 
a female skew in gender ratios in 2000 suggests that 
the neighborhood committees have been gendered as 
women’s work. Such gendering is certainly consistent 
with their lowly standing; neighborhood committees 
are the lowest administrative unit in urban China 
and lack the level of self-governance afforded to their 
counterparts in the villages.
Progress at higher levels has been less consis-
tent, though recent years suggest a possible uptick. 
The proportion of women among provincial-level 
elites sat at 10 percent in 2004, no different from sim-
ilar figures from Yinpeng Wang calculated for women 
among leaders of what Wang calls “state organs and 
leading bodies” in 1990.69, xii The share of women 
in the CPPCC increased from 9.2 percent in 1993 to 
16.8 percent in 2003, but female representation in the 
NPC and CPC reached their low points post-Mao 
in 2003 at 20.2 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. 
More recently, however, representation in the NPC 
rebounded to its highest level in history in 2013, and 
the female share of full and alternate PCC members 
reached its reform-era peak of 10 percent.70 More 
importantly, the Politburo admitted its first woman 
in the post-Mao era in 2002. Today, it has two female 
members for the first time since 1969, Vice-Premier 
Liu Yandong and Tianjin Party Secretary Sun Chun-
lan.71 Neither of them are wives of high-level cadres 
or “labor heroines,” as were the three Mao-era female 
full Politburo members. Rather, Liu Yandong and 
Sun Chunlan’s posts such as Vice-Chairwoman of the 
CPPCC and Party Secretary of China’s trade unions, 
respectively, have given them experience leading a 
host of different elements of the party-state bureau-
cracy.72
Some of these reform-era improvements in 
women’s representation in Chinese politics reflect 
the force state feminism has championed most vigi-
lantly since the launch of Reform and Opening Up: 
economic development. As Louise Edwards points 
out, this view is in certain ways consistent with tradi-
tional Party theory on women’s liberation, by which 
“it would be assumed that women’s status would be 
broadly improved with each increase in GDP—in-
cluding in the sphere of political participation.”73 
But if Mao-era state feminism promised liberation 
through development, it also mobilized women in 
xii  As with the instance cited above in fn. 8, Wang does not specify what she 
means by “State organs and their working bodies,” and I did not have access to 
the almanac from which she drew her figures. 
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the political and production processes to accelerate 
development itself. The reform-era vision of libera-
tion through development is more passive, with more 
of an emphasis on raising GDP levels and less on the 
targeted mobilization of women to realize that pur-
pose. 
Edwards is skeptical of this strategy, and, in 
some ways, she is right to be so. Speaking broadly, 
development’s impact on female representation in 
politics is tricky to assess. It is true that villagers tend 
to have a more conservative outlook on gender roles 
than urbanites, but using the urban-rural divide as a 
proxy for development assumes too tight a connec-
tion between urbanization and development. More 
targeted analyses of development give more am-
biguous results. As noted above, for instance, WVS 
data on Chinese attitudes towards women’s place in 
politics shows no significant change between 1995 
and 2004, despite annual GDP growth consistently 
hovering around 10 percent during the period. One 
might object that such changes would not appear 
over such a small time period, but a geographical 
comparison between locations at different GDP levels 
in China is likewise ambiguous about the significance 
of development. A gender equality index constructed 
by Fubing Su in his 1999–2004 survey of provincial-
level elites suggests that levels of development, as 
measured by per capita GDP, have only a small im-
pact upon women’s representation in politics.74 The 
impact for development is much smaller, for instance, 
than whether the unit in question is an autonomous 
region, a centrally administered city, or a province, or 
whether the region has a high sex ratio. Meanwhile, 
at the grassroots level, Guo, Zheng, and Yang’s study 
of Zhejiang villages found that the villages with the 
highest share of women’s representation on their 
village committees tended to be ones of moderate 
wealth.75 Poorer villages lacked the consciousness to 
push against traditional gender norms, while wealth-
ier villages were solely focused on economic develop-
ment, the perceived province of men.
International comparisons are also useful in 
pushing back against explanations centering around 
economic development. Japan’s per capita GDP 
exceeds $45,000, and yet it ranks 122nd out of 142 
countries in the latest Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU) tables on women in national parliaments.76 
Montgomery also observes that national parliaments 
in Post-Communist Europe demonstrate no clear 
connection between economic development and 
women’s share: Slovenia excels economically but has 
seen no change in women’s representation, whereas 
Bulgaria’s economic weakness does not prevent it 
from having one of the strongest female presences.77 
Inglehart and Norris’s analysis of IPU tables against 
GDP per capita demonstrates a strong correlation be-
tween economic development and female representa-
tion, but consideration of individual cases as above 
indicate that economic development here is likely 
disguising other factors.78
Nonetheless, economic development has bol-
stered women’s place in reform-era Chinese politics 
in one very specific way: by shrinking gender dispari-
ties in educational achievement, a key prerequisite 
for cadre selection under the discourse of suzhi. The 
gap in male and female gross enrollment ratios at 
secondary schools shrunk from 13 percent in 1983 
to 8 percent in 1997.79 The post-1999 expansion 
in college enrollment has also made major dents in 
post-secondary education gender gaps. A study by 
Wei-Jun Jean Yeung calculated that the male-female 
odds ratio for progression from senior high school 
to college fell from 1.84 to 0.99.80 The Party has 
aged moderately for much of the reform period, but 
recruits still skew heavily young: 75 percent of Party 
recruits 1997–2002 were under 35.81 In this sense, 
the Party is drawing from a pool of potential cadres 
in which men and women are increasingly similar in 
terms of their educational qualifications.
These shrinking gender gaps emerge directly 
from the state’s efforts to accelerate development 
through expanded access to education. Decades of 
growth have increased demand for skilled labor in 
the Chinese economy, a challenge that the state has 
addressed through massive investments in education. 
Due to the post-1999 expansion in higher educa-
tion mentioned above, annual college enrollment 
increased from 1 million in 1998 to 6.3 million in 
2009.82 At the lower levels, the number of elemen-
tary schools in China rose consistently between 1980 
and 2000, and slots in secondary schools have like-
wise seen steady increases.83 These initiatives have 
not been specifically targeted at gender disparities, 
but they have nonetheless allowed schools to accom-
modate a wider array of students—an important 
development, given traditional preferences for edu-
cating males.84 The state’s fixation on bolstering the 
Chinese economy has pressed it into this expansion. 
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It has also funded the expansion by improving tax 
revenues.85
The heightened demand for skilled labor in 
China has also raised payoffs for education.86 Urban 
China saw the marginal return of a year of education 
almost triple between 1992 and 2003 alone, from 4.0 
percent to 11.4 percent. Education has become the 
primary factor determining whether rural workers 
can find more lucrative off-campus jobs.87 Returns 
for women in urban China are even higher than 
those for men.88 As such, parents during the reform 
era have an increasingly powerful incentive to obtain 
good schooling for girls.
Shrinking gender gaps in educational achieve-
ment constitute a “supply-side” explanation for the 
increases in female representation over the past twen-
ty years—more women have attained the educational 
qualifications needed to become cadres. To be sure, 
it is not a comprehensive explanation. Analysis of 
2000 Census data in Hannum and Yang suggests that 
Hunan is a middling province in terms of educational 
outcomes, but its village committee representation 
rates are exceptional.89 Shanxi’s educational out-
comes for pre-1980 birth cohorts are equal or better 
to Hunan’s, but its village committee representation 
rate is among the lowest in the country: just 7.7 per-
cent.90 These inconsistencies indicate the shortcom-
ings of any analysis that links women’s progress en-
tirely with educational attainment.
At the same time, women’s place in politics 
during the reform era has also benefited from “de-
mand-side” initiatives by the state: a bevy of dictates 
on women’s participation in politics, following the 
Organizational Department’s first reform-era regula-
tion in 1988 mentioned above. The first PRC law on 
women’s rights was passed in 1992, followed by the 
first national reform-era gender equality program in 
1995, which explicitly set forward the goal of rais-
ing women’s participation in politics.91 In 2001, the 
Organizational Department expanded on the quotas 
it suggested for sub-county bodies in 1990 to propose 
figures for participation at higher levels: at least one 
woman in every government leadership group (ling-
dao banzi) and Party standing committee, along with 
specific targets for participation in these at the prov-
ince (10 percent), city (15 percent), and county (20 
percent) levels.92 The 10th NPC in 2007 mandated 
that its successors be at least 22 percent female and 
followed up in 2010 to demand that one-third of vil-
lage committee seats be reserved for women.93 More 
intriguingly, “an index of women’s participation” has 
been added as a criterion in officials’ performance 
evaluations.94 Subnational state organs have also 
taken steps of their own. In particular, several prov-
inces have issued regulations requiring at least one 
woman in village committees and other governing 
bodies.95 Hunan, in particular, is widely acclaimed as 
a progressive province.96 Representation in Hunan 
village committees is more than 30 percent female, 
and 17 percent of mayors in 2003 were women, well 
above the 2004 national average of 10.9 percent. To 
be sure, most state regulations on women’s participa-
tion in the reform era have no enforcement provi-
sions.97 Still, the state’s success in meeting many of 
its targets—such as those set by the National People’s 
Congress, or the Hunan mayoral and village commit-
tee level—suggests that these regulations have had 
more than a nominal impact.
State-derived feminism can explain in part the 
impetus for this raft of reforms. After the events at 
Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership hoped to 
improve its image worldwide by hosting the United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, 
awarded to China by the UN in March of 1992.98 
The event needed to be accompanied by a demon-
strated commitment to women’s rights domestically 
in order to have the desired impact on international 
audiences.99 The 1992 law on women’s rights and the 
1995 gender-equality program, in particular, reflect 
these pressures.
Still, the concept of state-derived feminism can-
not account for the role of the burgeoning Chinese 
women’s movement in bringing about the sorts of 
changes. In the early years of the reform period, the 
collapse of the communes closed important chan-
nels for women’s engagement in public life. As a 
result, production became an individual rather than 
a collective effort, and so women were once again 
relegated to domestic affairs (Rosen, 1995). Since 
then, however, the growth of civil society has cre-
ated a new space for public expression. That space 
has manifested itself most prominently in the late 
reform explosion in social organizations focused on 
women’s issues, especially in the cities.100 Women’s 
studies was unknown as a discipline in China until 
the ACWF held the first conference on the subject in 
1983.101 Ten years later, with the Beijing Conference 
approaching, sixteen research centers had been set up 
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around the country.102 The energy around women’s 
issues persisted well beyond the Beijing Conference; 
in 2000, there were 50,000 women’s associations affili-
ated with the ACWF alone.103 
The growth in civil society women’s groups has 
had little effect on citizen attitudes towards women in 
politics; calculations based on WVS data suggest that 
the proportion of Chinese who considered men more 
able in politics than women was consistently a slight 
majority from 1995 to 2004.104 Still, this proportion 
has been able to influence official policy in at least 
some capacity through the efforts of the ACWF, the 
only organization with the status to push for any seri-
ous policy change. In the late 1980s, under the influ-
ence of civil society feminism, the organization be-
came increasingly disenchanted with its mandate to 
champion the Party line.105 It has since grown more 
willing to represent women’s interests when they 
clash with Party interests.106 That shift has manifest-
ed itself in its efforts to improve women’s representa-
tion at a host of levels: putting forward candidates for 
local People’s Congress elections, offering training for 
prospective cadres, and lobbying for stronger quota 
provisions.107 Organizational Department regula-
tions on female cadre participation are formulated in 
conjunction with the ACWF. The existence of con-
crete targets in 1990 and 2001, as well as many of the 
subnational circulars noted above, were a direct result 
of ACWF input. At the grassroots level, Judd’s eth-
nography of a county in Shandong Province shows 
how pressure from the local ACWF branch brought 
about a surge in women’s participation in local village 
committees.108 
At this point, I should briefly discuss women’s 
political representation in China from another angle: 
intra-bureaucratic gender gaps. Scholars are unani-
mous in observing that women in the party-state 
bureaucracy consistently receive less prestigious 
assignments than men.109 One common saying 
among Chinese female cadres, “the three manys 
and the three fews,” sums up this problem nicely: 
“many in trivial positions, few in powerful positions; 
many deputies, few heads; many in culture, science, 
education, and health bureaus, few in economy and 
finance.”110 Su’s survey of provincial-level leaders 
finds that female elites are four times more likely than 
male elites to be given deputy assignments.111 170 of 
the 183 female village committee members in Wang 
and Dai’s survey of Zhejiang villages served as their 
committee directors for women’s affairs.112
I have glossed over intra-bureaucracy gender 
differentials in most of the paper because the extent 
to which they have been alleviated during the reform 
era is hard to assess. Time-series data on the ratios of 
deputies and heads, for instance, is difficult to come 
by. Many of the statistics on formal representation 
that I have cited in this paper concern positions in 
the party-state bureaucracy that are relatively presti-
gious at their administrative levels—mayor, Politburo 
member, village committee head, NPC delegate. 
Some of these increases in women’s representation in 
these positions have outstripped the rate of increase 
of female cadres’ total share, which rose by one-third; 
the share of female mayors, for instance, more than 
doubled. It seems also that more female mayors, 
at least, have been allowed to leave the traditional 
strongholds of culture, education and health (CEH). 
Rosen says that 70 percent of female mayors in 1989 
were assigned to one of these fields or to sports, while 
Wang reports that the 2001 share in CEH was down 
to 50.2 percent.113 
But to the “three manys, three fews” listed 
above, we might add another one: “many cadres, few 
in the Party.” And for all the gains in state organs, 
it may be most significant that this phenomenon 
has changed little in the reform era. Women’s share 
among cadres overall was twice their share among 
Party members in 1991; in 2004, the ratio was the 
same.114 Given the still-dominant role of the Party 
in Chinese politics, and the significance of Party 
membership for career advancement in the bureau-
cracy, the stagnation on this front should temper 
enthusiasm over other indications of the improving 
status of women within the cadre system.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
My essay has sought to offer a new vision of 
women’s political representation in the People’s Re-
public of China that reconciles existing narratives of 
early-reform decline and late-reform progress. The 
post-Mao era began with a rapid decline in women’s 
representation, with female cadres treated as sym-
bols of the Cultural Revolution’s influence on the 
party-state bureaucracy. Deng’s modernization push 
brought about a decade of stagnation, but the state’s 
tentative reconciliation with policies aimed at gen-
der equality starting in the 1990s has brought about 
modest advances since. We should no longer speak 
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of the monotonic decline in the reform era as Howell 
did in 2002, nor should we speak of its ebbs and flows 
as defined solely by the concept of state feminism. It 
remained dominant during the early reform period, 
but the growing women’s movement in Chinese civil 
society, has proved a significant factor in its own right 
over the past twenty years by persuading the AWCF 
to drift from its rigid adherence to Party theory.
It must be stressed that these advances over the 
past two decades are very modest—a few percent-
age points here, a few percentage points there. They 
certainly do not anoint China as an international 
standard bearer for female representation in govern-
ment. Women make up 23 percent of Chinese NPC 
delegates, the 55th largest share among parliaments 
worldwide.115 Thirteen percent of Chinese mayors 
are female, well above the regional average, but fe-
male mayors’ shares in Serbia and New Zealand are 
26 percent.116 2.7 percent of Chinese village com-
mittee heads are female; women in Cambodia, with-
out the help of quotas, make up 7.0 percent of the 
chairs of equivalent rural councils.117 And just as the 
early CCP relegated its female members to second-
class status by concentrating them in the Women’s 
Bureau, today’s party-state bureaucracy keeps women 
out of high politics through disproportionately low 
levels of Party membership.118 It will require a unit-
ed front between state and civil society—and not one 
that kowtows to the state’s needs, but one that takes 
the criticisms of civil society feminists as a guiding 
star—for China to establish a reputation as a leader in 
women’s participation in government.
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